Results of the Bank’s survey of wage-setting in Belgian firms by M. Druant et al.
results of the Bank’s survey of wage-setting  
in Belgian firMs
49
Results of the Bank’s survey of  
wage-setting in Belgian firms
M. druant
ph. du caju
ph. delhez  (1)
(1)  The authors wish to thank the more than 1,400 firms for their cooperation, the 
Bank’s short-term indicators section for conducting the survey, and the WDN 
participants for their comments.
Introduction : why conduct a survey  
on wage-setting ?
This article presents the results of a one-off survey of wage-
setting covering over 1,400 Belgian firms in manufactur-
ing industry, the energy sector, the construction sector, 
trade, business services and financial institutions employ-
ing at least five workers. The sectors covered by the survey 
together represent 55 p.c. of dependent employment in 
Belgian firms. The survey which was conducted by the 
Bank in the autumn of 2007 is the Belgian component 
of an initiative launched by the Wage Dynamics Network 
(WDN).  This  research  network  set  up  by  the  European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) examines wage dynamics 
in general and the existence of wage rigidity in particular.
The  WDN  is  a  sequel  to  the  ESCB’s  previous  Inflation 
Persistence Network (IPN), which had found considerable 
variations in price rigidity between sectors and products 
(Altissimo et al., 2006). Those variations were due in par-
ticular to the cost structure at firm and sector level. There 
were signs that the frequency of price adjustments is lower 
in sectors where the cost of labour forms a large propor-
tion of total costs, particularly in the service sector. Further 
research  on  wage  dynamics  was  therefore  desirable.
The WDN is divided into four groups. A “meta-group” acts 
as overall coordinator and aims to present general conclu-
sions and policy recommendations. The “macro-group” 
introduces  concepts  of  wage  rigidity  into  macroecono-
metric models. The “micro-group” uses microeconomic 
statistics to conduct econometric research into wage rigid-
ity and the behaviour of firms. This article is part of the 
work of the survey group. The WDN considered it useful 
– as in the case of the IPN – to conduct a survey in the 
various participating countries to accompany the empiri-
cal  analysis  based  on  individual  employees’  wage  data 
obtained, for instance, from administrative data banks. 
Seventeen countries agreed to such a survey. This article 
discusses the results of the Belgian survey, though without 
wishing to anticipate the overall results at European level 
which will not be published until the end of 2008.
This article comprises six sections. Section 1 explains the 
subject of the survey. The second section discusses the 
wage-setting  process,  while  the  third  section  examines 
the existence of downward rigidity and the reasons for it. 
Section 4 focuses on the reaction to three types of shocks. 
Section 5 discusses wage and price adjustments and the 
connection between the two. The final section sums up 
the main findings of the survey.
1.    Design of the survey
1.1    The questionnaire : preparation and content
The questionnaire was drawn up by the WDN in consulta-
tion with the seventeen participating countries, so that it 
is a harmonised questionnaire. Nonetheless, adjustments 
specific to particular countries were possible so long as 
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they did not endanger the comparability of the results 
between countries. Thus, some specific questions were 
added to the Belgian survey form, e.g. concerning the 
wage cushion, i.e. the buffer between the wages actu-
ally  paid  and  the  sectoral  pay  scales,  and  concerning 
the automatic wage indexation mechanism. In addition, 
some  questions  were  omitted  because  the  information 
was already available in the IPN survey of price-setting or 
in the social balance sheets. It was necessary to simplify 
the Belgian survey form after the test run conducted on 
twenty-one firms showed that the response time for the 
first draft was too long.
The final questionnaire was sent out in September 2007 
to all firms in the sample, namely a total of over 4,000. 
The  questionnaire  in  Annex  1  relates  to  manufactur-
ing  industry,  and  the  construction  and  energy  sectors. 
With  some  minor  terminological  adjustments,  a  similar 
questionnaire was sent to firms in the trade sector, the 
business  services  sector  and  financial  institutions.  The 
questionnaire  comprises  three  sections  with  a  total  of 
twenty-eight questions.
Section 1 contains questions on wage-setting – to provide 
some idea of the collective bargaining process, the total 
or partial application of pay scales and the variable ele-
ment of wages – and on the automatic wage indexation 
mechanism. Wages paid to newly recruited employees are 
also considered. In addition, the frequency and timing of 
pay adjustments are examined in depth.
Section 2 of the questionnaire examines the existence of 
downward wage rigidity and its causes. The questions are 
based on similar research in the United States (Blinder and 
Choi, 1990 ; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997), Sweden (Agell 
and Bennmarker, 2002) and Germany (Franz and Pfeiffer, 
2006). It also ascertains the response to three types of 
shock  : a weakening of demand, an increase in the cost 
of intermediate inputs, and a general rise in labour costs. 
The section concludes by examining the frequency and 
timing  of  price  adjustments,  and  their  link  with  wage 
adjustments.
Finally, the questions in section 3 concern the size of the 
workforce, the importance of labour costs, and the firm’s 
position in the economic cycle.
The answers have to be viewed in the context of the 2006 
annual accounts. Where wages are concerned, most of 
the questions concern the basic wage – i.e. the fixed pay 
excluding  bonuses  but  including  commission  –  of  the 
main occupational category in the firm. The occupational 
categories are defined in question 1.1 and permit a dis-
tinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers and 
between their skill levels. The survey deliberately avoided 
the usual classifications applied here, which often take 
account only of the highest education obtained. In regard 
to prices, the participants were also asked to relate their 
answers to their main product, i.e. the product generating 
the largest volume of turnover.
The questionnaire contains three types of questions. The 
first type requires participants to tick one or more answers. 
The second type asks them to indicate the relevance of a 
particular  statement,  offering  a  choice  between  “not 
important”,  “not  very  important”,  “important”,  “very 
important” and “don’t know”. In both cases the response 
breakdown is given disregarding any questions left blank 
or marked as “don’t know”. The third type of question 
asks for exact figures. A response rate is calculated for 
each answer (see Annex 2). The response is satisfactory 
in each case (roughly 80 p.c. or more), except for a few 
quantitative  questions.  This  article  therefore  does  not 
present the answer to these last questions.
1.2  The sample
The one-off survey sample was based on the sample used 
for the Bank’s monthly business survey of manufacturing 
industry, construction, trade and business services ; it was 
extended to include the energy sector and financial insti-
tutions. Conversely, firms with under five employees were 
omitted. Altogether the sample comprised 4,088 firms. In 
all, the sectors covered by the survey represent 55 p.c. of 
paid employment.
In total, 1,431 firms participated in the survey, represent-
ing a response rate of 35 p.c. In return for their coopera-
tion, the participants were sent the average responses for 
their sector. The sample was composed in such a way that 
large firms were over-represented. While the participating 
firms represent 3 p.c. of the total numbers in the popula-
tion, they account for 11 p.c. in terms of employment. 
Firms  in  manufacturing  industry  and  the  energy  and 
financial sectors were heavily represented in terms of the 
number of employees.
Some of the survey results need to be given a weighting in 
order to make them representative of the total population 
of firms. For this purpose, the population was divided into 
twenty-four  strata,  namely  six  groups  according  to  the 
sector of activity each of them composed of four groups 
according  to  the  number  of  workers.  The  WDN  had 
devised a weighting method which takes account of the 
availability in the seventeen countries of data on the total 
population of firms, divided into strata. In view of the 
survey  subject,  preference  was  accorded  to  weightings results of the Bank’s survey of wage-setting  
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– also referred to as sample weighting ratios – based on 
employment. They are calculated by taking the employ-
ment of the total population of the stratum and dividing 
it by the number of firms in the stratum in question. For a 
given observation (firm) they thus indicate the number of 
workers which that figure represents in the total popula-
tion, taking account of the firm’s size class and the sector 
to which it belongs. The sum of the sample weights of all 
firms together is equal to total dependent employment of 
the population making up the sample.
In  order  to  take  account  of  the  significance  of  a  par-
ticipating firm in the total sample – the response from a 
large firm is more important than that of a small firm in 
the wage-setting process as a whole – individual weights 
are calculated for each firm. Those weights are the ratio 
between employment in the firm and the total number 
of employees in the sample. Each firm is therefore given 
a dual weighting, namely the sample weighting of the 
stratum to which the firm belongs multiplied by the firm’s 
individual weighting.
The division into strata and, consequently, the calculation 
of the sample weights take no account of the classifica-
tion of the employees according to occupational status, 
because it is not possible to divide the staff in the total pop-
ulation of firms into the occupational categories identified 
in the survey. It was therefore decided to present these 
results and all the results relating to them in unweighted 
form. That is more particularly the case in sections 2 and 
3 of this article ; each table and chart specifies whether or 
not the figures are weighted.
2.    Wage-setting in firms
The first part of the survey contains questions on wage-
setting in firms. They are directed mainly at how the insti-
tutional context of wage-setting in Belgium determines 
the wage policy of the firms. For example, it is evident 
that the collective pay negotiations organised at secto-
ral  level  and  the  wage  indexation  mechanism  are  very 
important. However, firms can nevertheless deal with this 
institutional context in different ways, e.g. by concluding 
supplementary collective agreements at firm level. These 
aspects are covered by questions 1.2 to 1.9 in the survey.
2.1    Institutional aspects
One  of  the  main  institutional  aspects  of  wage-setting 
is the degree to which wages are determined by nego-
tiations  and  specified  in  collective  agreements.  Other 
research by the WDN shows that in the great majority of 
TABLE  1  SAMPLE




















Total  .............................. 44,624 1,771,454 1,431 194,650 3 11
Manufacturing industry   ............... 10,390 542,583 650 106,695 6 20
Energy  ............................. 30 14,888 11 2,591 37 18
Construction  ........................ 7,457 157,591 210 8,775 3 6
Trade  .............................. 15,871 396,938 297 29,541 2 7
Business services ..................... 10,485 541,701 237 19,965 2 4
Financial institutions  ................. 391 117,953 26 27,082 7 23
From 5 to 19 employees .............. 32,052 326,600 578 5,298 2 2
From 20 to 49 employees  ............ 8,309 274,436 378 12,255 5 4
From 50 to 199 employees  ........... 3,257 334,433 335 32,840 10 10
200 employees or more  .............. 1,006 835,985 140 144,257 14 17
Source : NBB.
(1)  Firms accountable for VAT in the sectors covered by the survey, 2005 data.
(2)  Firms submitting declarations to the NSSO and belonging to the sectors covered by the survey, data for the 2nd quarter of 2006.
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European countries wage negotiations are conducted col-
lectively and at various levels in the hierarchy (cf. Du Caju 
et al., 2008a). Often there is a general national guideline 
combined  with  more  specific  wage  bargaining  at  an 
intermediate level : sectoral, regional or per occupational 
category,  possibly  supplemented  by  more  decentralised 
negotiations at firm level. In many cases the consultations 
have a hierarchical structure with agreements at a higher 
level being binding for the lower levels  (1). However, there 
are variations between countries in regard to the domi-
nant level of pay negotiations. In Belgium this pattern, 
which is characteristic of many European countries, takes 
the form of the wage norm setting a national guideline 
and wage negotiations conducted predominantly at sec-
toral level in the joint committees, possibly supplemented 
by agreements at firm level. The indexation mechanism 
also plays an important role.
In the Bank’s survey, question 1.2 asks about the compe-
tent joint committee, and questions 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 look 
at the existence and importance of any collective wage 
agreements  concluded  at  firm  level.  Around  98  p.c.  of 
firms  in  the  survey  report  at  least  one  competent  joint 
committee, which is what one would expect in a country 
where  wage  bargaining  is  highly  organised  at  sectoral 
level, and sectoral agreements are generally declared to be 
binding throughout the sphere of competence of the joint 
committee. In this regard there are hardly any variations 
between sectors  (2) or between firms of differing sizes.
The situation is different for collective wage agreements 
concluded at the firm level. Only 26 p.c. of the firms claim 
to apply such an agreement. This result confirms what 
we have already found from another source, namely the 
Structure of Earnings Survey conducted by the DGSEI. This 
means that the dominant sectoral negotiations certainly 
do not preclude supplementary agreements at firm level. 
The survey results clearly show that pay agreements at 
firm level are, as expected, more common in the case of 
larger firms : 67 p.c. of firms employing 200 or more staff 
have such an agreement, compared to just 9 p.c. of firms 
with  between  5  and  19  employees.  This  explains  why 
the weighted total of the firms with a company agree-
ment is 30 p.c. Partly as a result of the concentration of 
large firms in some sectors, collective pay agreements at 
firm level appear relatively common in the energy sector, 
manufacturing industry and financial institutions, and less 
so in construction, trade and business services.
(1)  On the understanding that “opt-out” clauses can be applied in specific cases.
(2)  The figure for the energy sector is based on only a small number of firms, and 
must therefore be interpreted with caution.
TABLE  2  INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF WAGE-SETTING IN BELGIUM (QUESTIONS 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 AND 1.9)






Competent joint  
committee
 




by a ﬁxed amount  






Average number  
of indexations  
per annum
 
Total  .............................. 98 26 57 43 2
(98  ) (30  ) (36  ) (64  )
Manufacturing industry   ............... 98 42 58 42 1
Energy  ............................. 55 64 60 40 12
Construction  ........................ 100 15 34 66 4
Trade  .............................. 99 9 63 37 1
Business services ..................... 98 11 72 28 1
Financial institutions  ................. 100 40 14 86 6
From 5 to 19 employees .............. 98 9 70 30 2
From 20 to 49 employees  ............ 98 21 62 38 2
From 50 to 199 employees  ........... 98 43 47 53 2
200 employees or more  .............. 98 67 41 59 2
Source : NBB.
Unweighted results, re-scaled by excluding missing answers. Weighted totals in brackets.
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The percentage of workers covered by a collective wage 
agreement – i.e. the collective agreement coverage ratio – 
is particularly high in Belgian firms, compared with the 
ratio in other countries, the main reason being that the 
sectoral agreements are generally binding  (1). According to 
the survey data, that coverage ratio is at least 90 p.c., cor-
responding to traditional estimates for Belgium produced 
by international institutions (e.g. the OECD’s Employment 
Outlook). The coverage ratio is high in all sectors and size 
classes.
In all European countries, price movements are among the 
key determinants of wages, and in many countries there 
is some form of automatic link between prices and wages 
for a (sometimes considerable) number of employees (e.g. 
for the minimum wage or for the public sector). However, 
together  with  Luxembourg  and  Cyprus,  Belgium  has  a 
fairly general system of automatic indexation of nominal 
wages, although its effects are influenced by reference to 
the health index and by the operation of the wage norm. 
It is up to the joint committees to define the details of the 
general principle of wage indexation. Broadly speaking, 
two systems are possible. The first is the same as that for 
the public sector, whereby wages are adjusted in fixed 
instalments of 2 p.c. whenever the threshold is exceeded. 
A second system adjusts wages at fixed intervals (from 
once to twelve times a year), but by variable amounts.
The survey findings show that an unweighted 57 p.c. of 
firms apply a threshold index mechanism, whereas 43 p.c. 
operate a system of indexation at fixed intervals. The latter 
is  more  common  in  larger  firms,  so  that  the  weighted 
results (64 p.c.) indicate that the majority of employees 
come  under  this  mechanism.  On  average,  these  firms 
index wages twice a year, with more frequent adjustments 
in the energy sector, financial institutions and construction. 
In periods of low inflation, the system of indexation at 
fixed intervals leads to more frequent adjustments.
2.2    Wage levels
In  view  of  the  institutional  framework  of  wage-setting 
in Belgium, outlined above, and the way in which it is 
implemented in practice in the firms, the wages which 
firms actually pay to their employees naturally depend to 
a large degree on the collective agreements. In the Bank’s 
survey, question 1.12 asks about the factors determining 
the wage level of new staff recruited by the firm, and 
question  1.2  inquires  about  the  ratio  between  wages 
actually paid and the pay scales determined by the joint 
committees.
(1)  Question 1.5 in the survey concerns the coverage ratio. The results are not 
presented in this article.
TABLE  3  DETERMINANTS OF THE WAGES OF NEWLY RECRUITED EMPLOYEES (QUESTION 1.12)
















of comparable  
employees  




Total  .............................. 36 50 4 5 5
(45  ) (44  ) (6  ) (4  ) (1  )
Manufacturing industry   ............... 35 54 3 4 4
Energy  ............................. 27 64 9 0 0
Construction  ........................ 48 44 1 2 3
Trade  .............................. 28 49 6 6 10
Business services ..................... 37 47 6 8 3
Financial institutions  ................. 38 46 8 8 0
From 5 to 19 employees .............. 36 47 3 5 10
From 20 to 49 employees  ............ 30 59 4 4 3
From 50 to 199 employees  ........... 37 53 3 5 2
200 employees or more  .............. 50 36 8 5 1
Source : NBB.
Unweighted results, re-scaled by excluding missing answers. Weighted totals in brackets.
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According to the responses by firms in the survey sample, 
the level of wages paid to new employees is determined 
primarily  by  what  is  specified  in  collective  agreements 
(at the level of the sector or the firm) and by the wage 
level  of  comparable  employees  in  the  firm.  Almost 
90 p.c. of firms mention one of these two factors as the 
key determinant for new employees’ wages, with little 
variation  between  firms  operating  in  different  sectors. 
In large firms, the wages of new employees are slightly 
more  dependent  on  collective  agreements,  possibly  a 
firm agreement. Only around 5 p.c. of firms state that, 
in deciding the level of wages for new employees, they 
take account of the wages of comparable workers out-
side the firm (working for competitors) or the availability 
of the required workers on the labour market. Only really 
large firms, employing 200 or more staff, seem to take 
relatively greater account of the level of wages in other 
firms. Among the smallest firms, which are concentrated 
in the trade sector, 10 p.c. take no account of the deter-
minants listed.
Although  the  wages  of  new  employees  are  evidently 
determined largely by collective agreements, the wages 
which firms actually pay to their staff may still deviate 
from  the  scales  fixed  by  the  sectoral  agreements  con-
cluded by the joint committees. This may be done via 
collective wage agreements concluded at firm level, or 
a unilateral, voluntary pay policy on the part of the firm, 
whereby  the  staff  are  paid  above  the  minimum  levels 
for the sector. In the economic literature, this situation 
whereby the actual wages which a firm pays are higher 
than the mandatory pay scales set by collective agree-
ments concluded at a higher level is described as a “wage 
cushion”.  Such  a  wage  cushion  can  in  fact  provide  a 
buffer between the actual wage and the lower limit for 
that wage, so that the firm has more scope for adjust-
ing the actual wage in line with circumstances without 
coming  up  against  the  lower  limit  (cf.  Cardoso  and 
Portugal, 2005). A wage cushion may be formed where 
sectoral pay scales are very low, e.g. in heterogeneous 
sectors with wide variations between firms and workers, 
where it is difficult for the social partners to define gener-
ally valid pay conditions. A wage cushion may also exist 
as a result of circumstances in firms which perform well 
within the sector and have substantial ability to pay, so 
that the workers can demand a share of the proceeds via 
rent sharing (cf. Rycx and Rusinek, 2008 for an analysis 
of rent sharing in Belgium).
Survey question 1.2 deals in particular with this wage cush-
ion. It is evident that the actual wages paid to unskilled 
blue-collar workers are equal to the pay scales fixed by the 
joint committees in most of the firms questioned (62 p.c.), 
and in 49 p.c. of firms the same applies to skilled and 
supervisory blue-collar workers. In contrast, in the case of 
white-collar workers – and for highly-skilled staff (63 p.c.) 
even more so than for clerical workers (54 p.c.) – actual 
wages exceed the sectoral pay scales in most of the firms. 
TABLE  4  THE WAGE CUSHION : A BUFFER BETWEEN ACTUAL WAGES AND SECTORAL PAY SCALES (QUESTION 1.2)













Total  .............................. 37 50 54 63
Manufacturing industry   ............... 51 65 59 66
Energy  ............................. 0 17 13 50
Construction  ........................ 9 18 29 36
Trade  .............................. 35 54 56 65
Business services ..................... 18 30 56 67
Financial institutions  ................. 14 17 69 71
From 5 to 19 employees .............. 24 35 41 49
From 20 to 49 employees  ............ 31 44 48 60
From 50 to 199 employees  ........... 51 63 68 72
200 employees or more  .............. 65 68 75 80
Source : NBB.
Unweighted results, re-scaled by excluding missing answers.
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A negligible number of firms (under 1 p.c.) pay wages 
below the sectoral pay scales, either because the firms do 
not have to implement the agreement, e.g. because it is 
not generally binding, or because the firm uses staff who 
can be paid a lower wage (e.g. young trainees).
Examination  of  the  breakdown  by  sector  shows  that 
certain sectors are less inclined than others to pay wages 
above  the  levels  set  by  the  sectoral  agreements.  For 
instance, a wage cushion seems to be relatively uncom-
mon in the construction sector, which comprises many 
small and comparable firms with specific types of blue-
collar workers, whereas white-collar workers (both highly 
skilled and low-skilled) have a wage cushion, particularly 
in financial institutions. This is of course connected with 
the relative demand for this type of workers in the respec-
tive sectors.
The finding that the chance of a wage cushion increases 
with the skill level of the staff is also valid within each 
firm size class. However, the number of firms with a wage 
cushion rises the larger the firm’s workforce. The chance 
of  a  wage  cushion  for  each  category  of  employee  is 
greater in the larger size classes. This confirms the finding 
– which has already emerged from other research – of 
a “wage premium” for working in a large firm. A wage 
cushion  is  less  common  for  the  lower  skilled  than  for 
highly-skilled staff, but the difference between the two is 
narrower in large firms than in small ones.
3.    Downward wage rigidity
One of the main WDN research topics is downward wage 
rigidity, or the resistance to pay cuts in situations where, 
from  a  purely  economic  angle,  such  reductions  in  the 
price  of  labour  would  be  desirable.  In  this  respect  the 
survey of firms, and more particularly questions 2.1 to 
2.4, supplements the findings obtained from administra-
tive statistics on the wages of individual employees ; these 
findings were obtained by the WDN using the method 
developed  by  the  International  Wage  Flexibility  Project 
(IWFP) (cf. Du Caju et al., 2007 and Du Caju et al., 2008b 
for the results for Belgium).
3.1    Wage freeze and wage reduction
The IWFP results for Belgium presented by Du Caju et al. 
(2007) indicate a relatively negligible degree of downward 
nominal wage rigidity, but a high degree of real wage 
rigidity  (this  may  vary  between  groups  of  employees 
and between business sectors) which, for a country with 
substantial wage indexation, is totally in line with expec-
tations. The survey of firms asks whether, in the past five 
years, the firm has frozen the basic wages of its employ-
ees  (question  2.1)  or  reduced  their  basic  wages  (ques-
tion 2.2). The two questions were answered separately, 
so that some overlapping is possible.
TABLE  5  WAGE FREEZE AND / OR WAGE REDUCTION IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS (QUESTIONS 2.1 AND 2.2)
(percentages of the total)
 
Basic wages were frozen
 
Basic wages were reduced
 
Total  .................................................. 6.3 1.7
Manufacturing industry   ................................... 7.8 2.0
Energy  ................................................. 9.1 0.0
Construction  ............................................ 1.0 0.5
Trade  .................................................. 6.8 1.7
Business services ......................................... 5.5 2.1
Financial institutions  ..................................... 15.4 0.0
From 5 to 19 employees .................................. 3.3 0.4
From 20 to 49 employees  ................................ 4.8 1.9
From 50 to 199 employees  ............................... 8.1 3.3
200 employees or more  .................................. 18.6 2.9
Source : NBB.
Unweighted results, re-scaled by excluding missing answers.
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As  expected,  few  firms  answered  that  in  the  past  five 
years they had frozen the basic wages of some of their 
staff (6.3 p.c.) and/or reduced their wages (1.7 p.c.). In the 
specific context of Belgium, with automatic wage indexa-
tion,  both  wage  reductions  and  wage  freezes  amount 
to  real  wage  moderation,  i.e.  the  movement  in  wages 
remains below inflation. The results confirm a very small 
degree of such real wage moderation in the construction 
sector, as pointed out by Du Caju et al. (2008b). Just as 
in that study, which uses a more detailed definition of the 
economic sectors, the downward real wage rigidity in the 
service sector appears to be more pronounced in the case 
of business services than in financial institutions, where 
there has been more restructuring and real wage modera-
tion in the last five years. It seems that real wage modera-
tion is more common in large firms, possibly because of 
the more complex wage policy and the application of local 
agreements in those large firms.
3.2    Reasons for resistance to wage cuts and 
alternative ways of reducing labour costs
The  literature  on  economic  theory  mentions  various 
possible  reasons  why  firms  are  unable  or  unwilling  to 
reduce wages in a situation where such a move would 
be desirable from a purely economic angle. A number of 
established theories concerning the labour market imply 
the individual worker’s resistance to pay cuts. For instance, 
fairness theories state that pay cuts are regarded as unfair 
and unacceptable, and that they therefore damage the 
workers’ morale. The efficiency wage theory states that 
there is a direct link between the workers’ relative wage 
level  and  the  effort  that  they  are  prepared  to  put  in. 
Thus, lower wages would mean less effort (and less pro-
ductivity). In this context, workers would compare their 
wages with those of comparable workers in similar jobs. 
Insurance theories state that workers are more risk averse 
than firms, and that their primary concern is security and 
a stable wage, which firms are in turn prepared to offer. 
In that sense, firms provide their workers with security 
against  unpredictable  pay  cuts.  According  to  turnover 
models, a reduction in wages would primarily result in 
the departure of the most productive workers (those who 
could most easily find other employment), discouraging 
firms from pursuing a policy of pay cuts. There are also 
theories which stress the reluctance of firms to reduce 
wages, owing to their concern for their reputation and 
the associated ability to attract staff, and the recruitment 
costs involved. Finally, there is also the institutional aspect, 
whereby collective agreements may prevent pay cuts.
Question 2.3 in the survey of wage-setting in firms tests 
the validity of these theories. It is clear that a great major-
ity  of  the  respondent  firms  consider  almost  all  these 
theoretical explanations to be important or very important 
TABLE  6  RELEVANT REASONS WHY BASIC WAGES COULD NOT BE REDUCED (QUESTION 2.3)
(percentage of ﬁrms considering the reason to be important or very important)
 
From 5 to 19  
employees
 
From 20 to 49  
employees
 
From 50 to 199   
employees
 





It would damage staff morale  ............................. 85 89 90 89 88
It would have an adverse effect on the effort which staff put in 83 88 88 87 86
Staff do not like unexpected cuts in income   ................. 79 82 82 79 80
It would encourage the best staff to leave  .................. 75 79 82 81 78
It is prohibited by the employment legislation  
or by collective wage agreements  .......................... 64 75 87 93 75
It would make it difﬁcult to attract new workers   ............. 64 64 71 74 67
Staff compare their wages with those of comparable workers  
in other ﬁrms operating in the same market  ................ 62 66 68 67 65
It would lead to substantial costs in taking on  
and training new staff  ................................... 62 66 64 63 64
It would damage the ﬁrm’s reputation   ...................... 45 48 55 50 49
Source : NBB.
Unweighted results, re-scaled by excluding missing answers.
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in explaining the absence of pay cuts. It is the various 
theories on the personal commitment of the individual 
worker that seem to be particularly relevant, even more 
than the institutional impediments. The firm’s reputation 
is less often cited.
If  firms  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  reduce  wages  even 
though that is desirable from an economic angle, they 
have to look for other ways of responding to their eco-
nomic environment. One possibility might be to reduce 
labour costs in alternative ways. Question 2.4 considers 
the potential options. Various possibilities are suggested : 
taking on new workers at lower wages than those paid 
to staff leaving the firm voluntarily ; early retirement to 
replace expensive staff with cheaper personnel ; reducing 
or abolishing bonuses and other forms of variable remu-
neration ;  reducing  or  abolishing  remuneration  in  kind ; 
adjusting shift working and bonuses, and finally, delaying 
or freezing promotion. The respondent firms were also 
able to answer that none of these strategies applied.
Two-thirds of the firms state that they do not use any 
of the above alternative ways of reducing labour costs. 
Replacing  expensive  workers  with  cheaper  ones  when 
an employee leaves the firm voluntarily or retires is the 
commonest strategy, particularly in the case of low-skilled 
blue-collar  and  white-collar  workers.  Reducing  bonuses 
and delaying promotion are more common in the case of 
skilled staff and management, while reducing remunera-
tion in kind is more often the approach for unskilled blue-
collar workers. Adjustments to shift working are only rel-
evant for blue-collar workers in manufacturing industry.
There remains the question of how firms react to adverse 
demand and supply shocks in a situation in which it is 
difficult to reduce wages, and there is little opportunity to 
use alternative instruments to cut labour costs. That ques-
tion forms the subject of section 4 of this article.
4.    Reaction to shocks
Questions 2.5 to 2.10 concern the way in which firms 
respond to shocks, particularly a negative demand shock, 
an increase in the cost of intermediate inputs, or a gen-
eral rise in labour costs. In these three cases it seems that 
the  commonest  strategy  adopted  is  cost  reduction.  In 
addition, firms are more inclined to increase their prices 
after a “cost-push” shock than to cut prices in response 
to weaker demand. That is totally in line with the IPN 
findings (Aucremanne and Druant, 2005)  (1). Finally, firms 
generally only adjust their output in the event of a nega-
tive demand shock.
A  sectoral  analysis  of  the  response  (not  presented  in 
this article) shows that price adjustments are used to a 
significant extent in construction and trade. Section 5 of 
this article will show that it is precisely these sectors that 
have the most frequent price adjustments. Manufacturing 
industry is the only sector to cut output in response to a 
weakening of demand.
TABLE  7  ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING LABOUR COSTS (QUESTION 2.4)
















Recruitment of new workers at lower wages  
than those paid to staff leaving voluntarily  ..... 14 7 13 7 12
Early retirement to replace expensive staff  
with cheaper workers  ....................... 6 6 6 6 6
Reduction or abolition of bonuses  ............ 4 3 6 9 5
Reduction or abolition of remuneration in kind   .. 5 3 3 4 4
Adjustments to shift working ................. 7 4 1 0 4
Delaying or freezing promotion  ............... 5 5 7 8 6
None of these strategies   ..................... 59 72 64 65 63
Source : NBB.
Unweighted results, re-scaled by excluding missing answers.
 
(1)  The IPN survey showed that the principal motives for price increases lie in 
“cost-push” factors, while in the case of price reductions the main factors are 
competitors’ price cuts and weakening demand.58
Firms which responded to a shock by adjusting their costs 
were also asked what strategy they pursued. This article 
presents the average response of the firms taking all three 
shocks  together.  It  shows  that  almost  60  p.c.  of  firms 
reduced their costs by adjusting employment. The con-
traction of the workforce mainly concerns the number of 
permanent employees, and to a somewhat lesser extent 
the number of temporary workers. 28 p.c. of firms reduce 
their non-wage costs. Very few firms respond by cutting 
basic wages, and that is consistent with the downward 
wage rigidity already discussed, while in 14 p.c. of cases 
the  variable  pay  components  are  reduced.  Hardly  any 
firms adopt the strategy of reducing working time.
However, the pattern varies widely according to the size of 
the firm’s workforce. There is a clear, positive link between 
the size class and the response by adjusting employment : 
the larger the firm, the greater the reductions in the per-
manent and temporary workforce. While 25 p.c. of the 
smallest firms make staff cuts, two-thirds of the largest do 
so. The largest firms also make relatively more reductions 
in their temporary workforce, but they also employ more 
such workers. Conversely, the link with adjustments to 
non-wage costs is negative, and the proportion of firms 
using  this  strategy  falls  from  two-thirds  in  the  case  of 
firms with 5 to 19 employees to one-fifth in the case of 
firms with 200 or more employees. Large firms are more 
likely than small ones to have greater scope to reduce 
their workforce in the event of difficulties. That is perhaps 
also the reason why it is virtually only the smallest firms 
with 5 to 19 employees which apply the strategy of reduc-
ing working time, although only 8 p.c. of them do so.
It is not possible to demonstrate a clear link between the 
sector and the degree to which the adjustment is made via 
employment. Sectors where labour costs form a large propor-
tion of the total expenses, namely business services and the 
financial sector, do not pursue this strategy any more often 
than sectors with a low proportion of labour costs, such as 
the energy sector : on the contrary. In the financial sector, the 
adjustment process largely operates via temporary employ-
ment, but that is hardly ever the case in the energy and con-
struction sectors. Here it is not possible to show any link with 
the percentage of temporary workers in the total workforce.
The adjustment of wages, particularly variable pay, is the 
commonest  strategy  in  the  sectors  which,  on  average, 
pay larger bonuses, namely trade and construction. The 
high figure of 24 p.c. in business services is rather odd 
since bonuses are not significant in this sector. Probably 
this section of the survey mistakenly regarded commission 
100 0 20 40 60 80
CHART 1  COST-CUTTING STRATEGIES 
(QUESTIONS 2.6, 2.8 AND 2.10)
  (average response to three shocks ; percentages of the total)
Source : NBB.
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled 
by excluding missing answers.
Basic wages
Variable components of wages
Number of permanent employees
Number of temporary employees
Number of hours worked
Non-wage costs
Total
From 50 to 199 
employees
200 or more 
employees
From 5 to 19 
employees
From 20 to 49 
employees
TABLE  8  REACTION TO SHOCKS (QUESTIONS 2.5, 2.7 AND 2.9)










Weakening of demand  ............... 40 52 34 75
Rise in the cost of intermediate inputs   .. 57 42 13 75
Rise in labour costs  .................. 62 50 11 67
Source : NBB.
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled by excluding missing answers.
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– which is commonly paid – as a variable pay component, 
whereas the questionnaire defined it as part of the basic 
wage.
The importance of the employment channel as a cost reduc-
tion strategy is confirmed by the answers to question 2.4 
(cf.  section  3  of  this  article),  which  concerns  alternative 
strategies aimed at cutting labour costs. Almost two-thirds 
of firms state that they do not use any of these strategies.
5.    Wage and price adjustments
A major part of the questionnaire deals with the frequency 
and  timing  of  price  and  wage  adjustments.  While  the 
questions on price adjustments can be used to verify some 
of the results of the IPN survey on pricing  (1), the questions 
on wage adjustments are an additional source of informa-
tion – supplementing the micro data – in the research on 
wage  dynamics.  By  combining  the  answers  to  the  two 
types of questions it is possible to examine in more detail 
the link between prices and wages. In addition, the survey 
includes  an  explicit  question  on  the  link  between  the 
timing of wage adjustments and price adjustments.
5.1    Frequency and timing of price adjustments
Question  2.11  asks  firms  to  indicate  how  often  they 
adjust  the  price  of  their  main  product  under  normal 
circumstances. The answer is no more than once a year 
(1)  That is the case for countries such as Belgium which conducted an IPN survey. For 





























































































































































































































Less than once a year
Once a year
Every three to six months
Daily to monthly
FREQUENCY (question 2.11)
PRICE ADJUSTMENTS CONCENTRATED IN PARTICULAR MONTHS 
(question 2.12)
Average duration in months
CHART 2  FREQUENCY AND TIMING OF PRICE ADJUSTMENTS PER SECTOR AND PER SIZE CLASS
  (percentages of the total)
Source : NBB.
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled by excluding missing answers.



















































































































































































(1)  That is the case for countries such as Belgium which conducted an IPN survey.  
For other countries it is a new source of information.60
for 37 p.c. of firms. The same percentage say that they 
do not follow any specific pattern, while the remaining 
26 p.c. adjust their prices more frequently. In the financial 
sector, in particular, there is a noticeable lack of any price 
adjustment pattern : the “price” is largely represented by 
the interest rate margin, so that the questions may be less 
relevant for this sector. Moreover, the survey took place in 
a period of financial market turmoil.
The level of detail in the possible answers (daily, weekly, 
etc.) permits an approximation of the average implicit 
duration  between  two  successive  price  changes.  That 
average interval is expressed in months. Naturally, it is 
not possible to take account of observations where no 
specific adjustment pattern is followed or where prices 
never change. In the case of firms answering “less than 
once  every  two  years”,  the  duration  is  estimated  at 
36 months. On that basis the average interval between 
two  successive  price  changes  is  8  months.  Following 
adjustment for an important outlier in the distribution 
sector – which comes under trade – where prices are 
adjusted very frequently, the figure comes to 10 months. 
That is shorter than the average duration found in the 
IPN survey, namely 13 months, but it may point to prob-
lems of comparability between the two sources. In the 
IPN survey, the firms themselves had to enter a figure 
for the total number of price adjustments, which per-
mitted a more accurate calculation of the benchmark, 
and  the  options  “no  specific  pattern”  and  “never” 
were not available, so that all the answers were taken 
into  account.  Moreover,  the  financial  sector,  which  in 
the  WDN  survey  featured  frequent  price  adjustments 
for firms indicating a price adjustment pattern, was not 
included in the IPN survey sample.
Conversely,  this  benchmark  duration  can  be  used  to 
compare the results per sector and per size class within 
the WDN survey. The average interval between two price 
adjustments is shortest in construction (7  months), the 
financial sector (8 months) and trade (9 months, follow-
ing  adjustment  for  the  outlier).  Price  adjustments  are 
least frequent in business services (11 months) and the 
energy sector (12 months). Manufacturing industry is in 
an intermediate position with 10 months. The IPN survey 
found similar differences between sectors. The variations 
between  size  classes  are  less  pronounced :  the  average 
interval ranges between 9 and 11 months.
The  timing  of  price  adjustments,  and  particularly  their 
potential concentration in particular months, is examined 
in question 2.12. The literature on the subject often dis-
tinguishes between time-dependent and state-dependent 
price strategies. In the case of time-dependent pricing, the 
timing of the adjustment is exogenous ; in other words, it 
does not depend on the economic situation. In contrast, 
in the case of state-dependent behaviour, the timing of 
the price adjustment does depend on economic condi-
tions. Which of the two approaches determines corporate 
pricing strategies is important for monetary policy. In a 
state-dependent context, prices will respond immediately 
if the shocks are sufficiently severe, whereas in a time-
dependent context firms will wait for the predetermined 
moment even in the case of major shocks.
Time-dependent price adjustments are applied by 22 p.c. 
of firms, i.e. they adjust their prices in one or more specific 
months of the year. That figure was 26 p.c. in the IPN 
survey, even in the event of a sufficiently severe shock. 
Time-dependent  pricing  is  particularly  common  in  the 
business service sector, in combination with less frequent 
price adjustments, indicating price rigidity.
5.2    Frequency and timing of wage adjustments
Question 1.10 examines the frequency of wage adjust-
ments from three specific angles. Firms had to state how 
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CHART 3 F REQUENCY OF BASIC WAGE ADJUSTMENTS 
(QUESTION 1.10)
  (percentages of the total)
Source : NBB.
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled 
by excluding missing answers.results of the Bank’s survey of wage-setting  
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category of employees. It distinguished between wage 
adjustments  due  to  inflation,  those  due  to  seniority 
and those unconnected with either of these factors. A 
composite variable was then devised to summarise the 
frequency of wage adjustments for any of the reasons 
mentioned,  being,  for  each  observation,  the  highest 
frequency  of  the  three  reasons  of  adjustment  tested. 
The underlying idea here is that any wage adjustment, 
regardless of the reason, is a sign of flexibility.
Half of firms adjust wages once a year ; 44 p.c. do so more 
often, and 5 p.c. less often. This means that 56 p.c. of 
firms adjust their wages no more than once a year, while 
in the case of price adjustments the figure was 37 p.c. The 
highest frequency applies to adjustments due to inflation, 
with a lower frequency for those due to seniority and rea-
sons other than inflation. In the last two cases, only 1 p.c. 
of firms adjust wages more than once a year. These results 
tally with the picture revealed by the micro data, indicat-
ing negligible nominal rigidity and greater real rigidity (Du 
Caju et al., 2007).
In the absence of sufficiently detailed information on the 
number of wage adjustments, and in contrast to what was 
done for prices, it is not possible to calculate any average 
duration.  The  frequency  distribution  shows  that  wages 
change least frequently in trade, manufacturing industry 
and business services ; over 80 p.c. of firms in these sec-
tors adjust wages no more than once a year. A very high 
frequency of adjustments is found in the financial sector, 
where barely 2 p.c. of firms adjust wages annually or less 
often, followed by construction (34 p.c.) and the energy 
sector (40 p.c.). These are precisely the sectors where the 
highest frequency of indexation is found. In regard to the 
size classes, the frequency increases the larger the work-
force, but in the case of very large firms with 200 or more 
employees it declines again.
Question 1.11 asks about time-dependent wage adjust-
ments, i.e. adjustments to wages in one or more specific 
months : 61 p.c. of firms adopt this practice. The energy 
sector, trade and the smallest firms are those which make 













CHART 4  FREQUENCY AND TIMING OF BASIC WAGE ADJUSTMENTS PER SECTOR AND PER SIZE CLASS
  (percentages of the total)
Source : NBB.
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled by excluding missing answers.
Never
Less than once a year
Once a year
More than once a year
FREQUENCY OF BASIC WAGE ADJUSTMENTS FOR ANY REASON
(question 1.10)








































































































































































































































































































































































5.3    Link between wage and price adjustments
If the answers to questions 1.11 and 2.12 are considered 
jointly, it is possible to compare the timing of wage adjust-
ments and price adjustments. Both are concentrated in 
the month of January. Many price and wage adjustments 
also take place in July ; in the case of wages, in particular, 
there is a degree of concentration at the beginning of the 
second and fourth quarters.
The  fact  that  almost  two-thirds  of  firms  apply  time-
dependent  wage  adjustments,  and  that  these  adjust-
ments are concentrated in particular months of the year, 
is inextricably linked with the automatic wage indexation 
mechanism  discussed  in  section  2  of  this  article.  The 
majority of firms in fact index wages at fixed intervals, 
with an average frequency of twice a year.
The picture of coordinated price and wage adjustments 
concentrated in January and July is not borne out by the 
answers to question 2.13 on the closeness and direction 
of  the  link  between  the  timing  of  decisions  to  adjust 
prices and wages. In 62 p.c. of cases there is no connec-
tion between the two decisions, while in 17 p.c. of firms 
there is a connection but no specific pattern, and only the 
remaining 21 p.c. state that there is a close link. In regard 
to the direction, the decisions are simultaneous in 5 p.c. 
of firms, prices follow wages in 9 p.c. of firms, and wages 
follow prices in 6 p.c. of firms. The link between wages 
30 25 20 15 10 51 01 52 0 5 0
CHART 5 T IMING OF WAGE AND PRICE ADJUSTMENTS 
(QUESTIONS 1.11 AND 2.12)
  (percentages of the total)
Source : NBB.
Results weighted on the basis of employment and re-scaled



















and prices is strongest in business services, the construc-
tion  and  energy  sectors  and  the  largest  firms.  Further 
research will need to examine whether factors such as 
competitiveness and cost structure play a role here.
Conclusion
The  analysis  presented  in  this  article  is  the  outcome 
of  a  survey  conducted  by  the  Bank  and  forming  the 
Belgian component of an initiative launched by the Wage 
Dynamics  Network  (WDN).  The  sectors  covered  by  the 
survey together represent 55 p.c. of dependent employ-
ment in Belgian firms ; 1,431 firms took part in the survey, 
implying a response rate of 35 p.c.
In  Belgium  the  institutional  model  typical  of  many 
European countries, in which wages are negotiated suc-
cessively at various levels in the hierarchy, takes the form 
of  the  wage  norm  (defining  a  national  guideline),  pay 
negotiations conducted primarily at sectoral level by the 
joint  committees,  and  possibly  additional  agreements 
concluded at firm level. Almost all the respondent firms 
refer to at least one competent joint committee, and just 
over a quarter apply a collective wage agreement at the 
firm level. Such collective agreements are more common 
in large firms, and in the energy sector, manufacturing 
industry and financial institutions.
In  all  European  countries,  prices  are  one  of  the  key 
determinants  of  wages,  and  in  Belgium  the  indexation 
mechanism  plays  a  significant  role  in  that  respect.  The 
survey results show that just over half of firms apply a 
mechanism with a threshold index, while just under half 
operate in an environment where indexation takes place 
at fixed intervals. The latter system is more common in 
large firms, so that the weighted results indicate that this 
mechanism applies to the majority of employees.
In the respondent firms, the level of wages of new employ-
ees depends mainly on what is specified in collective agree-
ments and on the wage level of comparable employees in 
the firm. However, the wages which the firm actually pays 
to its staff may deviate from the pay scales specified in the 
sectoral agreements by the joint committees. The actual 
wages paid to unskilled blue-collar workers correspond in 
the majority of the firms surveyed to the pay scales set by 
the joint committees. In contrast, in the case of white-col-
lar workers – and for skilled staff, in particular, rather than 
clerical workers – the actual wages paid in the majority of 
the firms surveyed exceed the sectoral pay scales. Such a 
wage cushion, forming a buffer between the actual wages 
and the collectively agreed lower limits, is more common 
in large firms.results of the Bank’s survey of wage-setting  
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Only a few firms have frozen or reduced the basic wage 
for some of their employees in the recent past. This is due 
mainly to labour market theories concerning the personal 
commitment of individual employees (“efficiency wages”, 
“fairness”  and  “turnover”),  and  institutional  obstacles. 
Overall, firms seldom respond to adverse shocks by cut-
ting basic wages or using alternative ways of reducing 
labour costs per employee. Certainly in large firms, costs 
are reduced mainly via the employment channel, i.e. by 
reducing the number of primarily permanent staff, and 
to a lesser extent temporary workers. Reductions in non-
wage costs are also important, while variable pay com-
ponents are only cut in a small number of cases. Wage 
adjustments,  particularly  adjustments  to  the  variable 
component, are most often applied in the sectors which, 
on average, pay higher bonuses, namely trade and con-
struction. The strategy of reducing working time is little 
used except in small firms, which have a much narrower 
margin for resorting to the employment channel.
In regard to the frequency of price adjustments, only a 
quarter of firms state that they adjust their prices more 
than once a year. The average interval between two price 
adjustments is shortest in construction, the financial sector 
and trade. Prices are adjusted least frequently in business 
services  and  the  energy  sector.  Manufacturing  industry 
is in an intermediate position. As regards the timing of 
the price adjustments, a distinction which is relevant for 
monetary policy is made between time-dependent price 
strategies, in which the time of the adjustment does not 
depend  on  economic  conditions,  and  state-dependent 
price  strategies  in  which  prices  respond  immediately  if 
the shocks are sufficiently severe. Time-dependent price 
adjustments occur in 22 p.c. of firms, and are noticeably 
common in the business service sector. Combined with 
the  low  frequency  of  price  adjustments,  this  indicates 
price rigidity in that sector.
The frequency and timing of wage adjustments are closely 
linked to the indexation mechanism applied. Most firms 
adjust their wages no more than once a year. Adjustments 
due  to  inflation  are  made  the  most  frequently,  while 
adjustments  due  to  seniority  and  reasons  unconnected 
with inflation and seniority are the least frequent. Wages 
are adjusted least often in trade, manufacturing industry 
and business services. A very high frequency of adjust-
ments is found in the financial sector, followed by con-
struction and the energy sector. These are precisely the 
sectors  where  the  frequency  of  indexation  is  highest. 
Time-dependent wage adjustments in a specific month 
apply to 61 p.c. of firms, and – like price adjustments – 
wage  adjustments  are  concentrated  in  the  month  of 
January. Another peak occurs in July, and there is some 
concentration at the beginning of the second and fourth 
quarters,  particularly  in  the  case  of  wage  adjustments. 
However,  this  picture  of  simultaneous  wage  and  price 
adjustments is not borne out by other survey results on 
coordinated decisions to adjust wages and prices ; only 
one-fifth of the participants state that the timing of the 
two decisions is closely linked.
To  sum  up,  the  results  of  this  survey  largely  tally  with 
information available elsewhere. However, they do add 
some  new,  relevant  findings  which  already  provide  a 
clearer idea of the complex practice of wage-setting in 
firms.  Nevertheless,  more  detailed  research  is  needed 
on the basis of the data set combined with the survey 
results for other European countries. Such analyses are 
useful because the single monetary policy in the euro area 
increases the importance of balanced wage setting.64
Annex 1
   




Telephone help-line concerning the 
questionnaire: +32(0)2 221 21 55 
 
Please return the questionnaire duly completed 
by no later than 10 October 2007
 
   
WAGE-SETTING SURVEY 
Manufacturing Industry - Construction - Energy 
You can send us your answers in the attached reply envelope, via our free fax line 0800 95 969 (only in Belgium) or via our 
standard fax line +32(0)2 221 31 07 (from other countries). 
 
This survey is being conducted under the supervision and on the authority of the National Bank of Belgium. The information 
obtained will be used exclusively for analysis purposes and will only be circulated in aggregate form, keeping individual 
answers strictly confidential. The participants will receive a summary of the survey’s main results. 
 
Below are some instructions on completing the questionnaire.  
1. Reference period: the period covered by your annual accounts for the year 2006. In the questionnaire you will be asked to 
refer either to the “reference period” or to the “end of the reference period”. 
2. Figures: if you have any problems in supplying exact figures, please give an approximate value. 
3. Who is the person best placed to complete the questionnaire? The personnel manager or the business manager seem to 
be the persons best able to answer the questions; the information on turnover and the cost structure of your business, 
requested in section 3, can be obtained from the annual accounts. 
What is your firm’s main activity?........................................................................... 
Your VAT number: .......................................................................................................................... 
 
SECTION 1: SETTING AND ADJUSTING WAGES 
 
1.1  What  was  the  breakdown  per  occupational  category  of  workers  in  your  firm  at  the  end  of  the 
reference period? In classifying your staff, take account of the standard of qualifications, experience 
and content of the job (supervisory or non-supervisory position).   
production workers  ...............  %  1101 
skilled and supervisory blue-collar workers  ...............  %  1102 
clerical staff  ...............  %  1103 
highly-skilled and management staff  ...............  %  1104 
TOTAL     100  %   
 
1.2  What is the number of the joint committee or subcommittee applicable to your workers? (if more 
than one, list them in order of importance)   
  blue-collar workers:  n° ..........  n°..........  1200 - 1 
  white-collar workers:  n° ..........  n°..........  1203 - 4 
 




    2
 
   
Do the wages actually paid in your firm differ, on average, from the current scales set by the joint 
committee? (Please tick one answer per column) 
  Production  Skilled and  Clerical    Highly-skilled 
  workers  supervisory  staff  and 
    blue-collar workers    management staff 
  1211 - 12-13  1221 - 22-23  1231 - 32-33  1241 - 42-43 
x  no    1    1    1    1 
x  yes, they are higher    2    2    2    2 
    by how much?........... %  by how much?........... %  by how much?......... % by how much?...... % 
x  yes, they are lower    3    3    3    3 
    by how much?.......... %  by how much?........... %  by how much?......... % by how much?...... % 
 
What level of wages does your firm pay in comparison with competitors?  
(Please tick only one answer)  1251 
x  lower    1 
x  roughly the same    2 
x  higher    3 
x  don’t know    4 
 
1.3  Is your firm covered by a collective wage agreement concluded outside the firm? (Please tick only 
one answer)   1301 
x  no, there is no agreement    1       
x  no, we opt out    2   
x  yes, we apply it    3   
 
1.4  Is your firm covered by a collective wage agreement concluded within the firm?  1401 
x  no      1       
x  yes    2   
 
1.5  If you have answered "yes" to question 1.3 or 1.4, what percentage of your workforce is covered by 
these collective wage agreements (taking all agreements together)? 
  per cent  1501 66
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In the rest of the questionnaire, some questions concern basic wages while others are interested in variable wages. 
Basic wages = fixed remuneration excluding bonuses; in other words, standard remuneration and wages, and commission. 
Variable wages = bonuses dependent on individual performance or the firm’s results. 
 
1.6  What percentage of the wage bill during the reference period was variable? 
  Production  Skilled   Clerical  Highly-skilled   
  workers  and supervisory  staff  and 
    blue-collar workers    management staff 
 
x  bonuses based on individual 
  performance  ........  %  1601  ........  %  1602  .........  %  1603  .......  %  1604 
x  bonuses based on the   
  firm’s results  ........  %  1611  ........  %  1612  .........  %  1613  .......  %  1614 
 
1.7  Does your firm have a policy of adjusting basic wages in line with inflation?  1701 
x  yes      1  ) go to 1.8 
x  no      2  ) go to 1.10   
 
1.8  In what way do basic wage adjustments depend on inflation?  
(Please tick only one answer)   1801 
x  wage adjustments are automatically linked to:       
-  past inflation    1 
-  forecast inflation    2 
x  wage adjustments take informal account of : 
-  past inflation    3 
-  forecast inflation    4 
 
1.9  What is the current automatic indexation system? (Please tick only one answer) 
x  indexation on exceeding a threshold index    1   1901 
x  indexation at fixed intervals        2 how many times a year? .......... 1902 
 
1.10  For the main occupational category represented in your firm (cf. question 1.1), how often are basic 
wages generally adjusted? (Please tick one answer per point) 
  More than  Once a  Every   Less  Never 
  once a year  year  two     than 
  years  every 
    two years 
x  wage adjustments according to criteria 
other than seniority and inflation    1    2    3    4    5  1111 
x  wage adjustments according to  
  seniority    1    2    3    4    5  1112 
x  wage adjustments according to  
  inflation    1    2    3    4    5  1113 
go to 1.9 
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1.11  Under normal circumstances, are basic wages changed in any particular month(s)? 
x  no    1  1121 
x  yes, please specify which month(s)     
J    F    M    A    M    J    J    A    S    O    N    D   
  01    02    03    04    05    06    07    08    09    10    11    12  1122 
 
1.12  For the main occupational category represented in your firm (cf. question 1.1), what is the main 
determinant of the wages of new employees recruited by your firm? (Please tick only one answer) 
  1131 
x  collective wage agreement (taking all agreements together)    1 
x  wages of comparable workers in the firm    2 
x  wages of comparable workers outside the firm    3 
x  availability of comparable workers on the labour market    4 






SECTION 2: DOWNWARD WAGE RIGIDITY, RESPONSE TO SHOCKS AND  
PRICE ADJUSTMENTS 
2.1  In the past five years, have the basic wages of certain workers in your firm been frozen? 
x  no    1              2101 
x  yes    1  ........  %  of personnel    2102 - 3 
 
2.2  In the past five years, have the basic wages of certain workers in your firm been reduced? 
x  no    1              2201 
x  yes    1  ........  %  of personnel    2202 - 3 
 68
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2.3  There are many reasons why basic wages should not be reduced – or should only be cut very 
slightly -  even if your firm needs to reduce its labour costs. Please indicate how important these 
reasons are for your firm. (Please tick one answer per point) 
  Not  Not very    Very  Don’t know 
  important  important  Important  important   
x  it is prohibited by the labour regulations 
  or by collective wage agreements    1    2    3    4    5  2301 
x  it would have an adverse effect on the  
  efforts of workers     1    2    3    4    5  2302 
x  it would be bad for the workers’ morale    1    2    3    4    5  2303 
x  it would damage the firm’s reputation    1    2    3    4    5  2304 
x  it would encourage the best workers to 
  leave    1    2    3    4    5  2305 
x  it would entail substantial costs relating 
  to recruitment and the training of new 
  workers    1    2    3    4    5  2306 
x  it would make it difficult to recruit new  
  workers    1    2    3    4    5  2307 
x  workers do not like unexpected reductions 
  in income    1    2    3    4    5  2308 
x  workers compare their wages with those  
  of comparable workers employed in other 
  firms operating in the same market    1    2    3    4    5  2309 
 
2.4  Apart from reducing or freezing basic wages, do you use other strategies to reduce labour costs? 
(You may tick more than one answer per column) 
    Production  Skilled and   Clerical  Highly-skilled 
    workers  supervisory  staff  and  
      blue-collar workers  management  
        staff 
 
 
x  recruitment of new workers  
  (comparable in terms of experience and  
  qualifications) at wages lower than those  
  paid to staff leaving voluntarily    1    2    3    4  2401 
x  use of early retirement to replace workers on high  
  wages with workers on lower wages    1    2    3    4  2402 
x  reduction or abolition of bonuses    1    2    3    4  2403 
x  reduction or abolition of benefits in kind    1    2    3    4  2404 
x  adjustments to shift working    1    2    3    4  2405 
x  delaying or freezing promotion    1    2    3    4  2406 
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In answering the questions below, please refer to your main product (i.e. the one generating the largest percentage of your 
turnover during the reference period) and the main occupational category in your firm (identified in question 1.1).  
 
2.5  How does your firm respond to an unexpected weakening of demand? 
(Please tick one answer per point)   
  Not  Not very    Very  Don’t 
  important  important  Important  important  know 
x  it reduces prices    1    2    3    4    5  2501 
x  it reduces margins    1    2    3    4    5  2502 
x  it cuts production    1    2    3    4    5  2503 
x  it reduces costs    1    2    3    4    5  2504 
 
2.6  If, in your answer to question 2.5, you attach any importance to cost reductions (boxes 2 to 4), 
indicate the main strategy which you use to achieve this objective. (Please tick only one answer)     
x  reduce basic wages    1 
x  reduce the variable components of wages (e.g. bonuses)    2 
x  reduce the number of permanent staff    3 
x  reduce the number of temporary staff/other persons 
working for the firm    4 
x  adjust the number of hours per worker    5 
x  reduce costs unconnected with labour    6 
 
2.7  How does your firm respond to an unexpected increase in the cost of intermediate inputs 
affecting all firms in the market (e.g. a rise in oil prices)? 
(Please tick one answer per point)   
  Not  Not very    Very  Don’t 
  important  important  Important  important  know 
x  it increases prices    1    2    3    4    5  2701 
x  it reduces margins    1    2    3    4    5  2702 
x  it cuts production    1    2    3    4    5  2703 
x  it reduces other costs    1    2    3    4    5  2704 
 
2.8  If, in your answer to question 2.7, you attach any importance to the reduction of other costs (boxes 2 
to 4), indicate the main strategy that you use to achieve this objective. (Please tick only one answer)     
x  reduce basic wages    1 
x  reduce the variable components of wages (e.g. bonuses)    2 
x  reduce the number of permanent staff    3 
x  reduce the number of temporary staff/other persons 
working for the firm    4 
x  adjust the number of hours per worker    5 
x  reduce costs unconnected with labour    6 70
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2.9  How  does  your  firm  respond  to an unexpected and permanent increase in labour costs 
affecting all firms in the market? (Please tick one answer per point)   
  Not  Not very    Very  Don’t 
  important  important  Important  important  know 
x  it increases prices    1    2    3    4    5  2901 
x  it reduces margins    1    2    3    4    5  2902 
x  it cuts production    1    2    3    4    5  2903 
x  it reduces other costs    1    2    3    4    5  2904 
 
2.10  If, in your answer to question 2.9, you attach any importance to the reduction of other costs (boxes 2 
to 4), indicate the main strategy that you use to achieve this objective. (Please tick only one answer)     
x  reduce the variable components of wages (e.g. bonuses)    1 
x  reduce the number of permanent staff    2 
x  reduce the number of temporary staff/other persons 
working for the firm    3 
x  adjust the number of hours per worker    4 
x  reduce costs unconnected with labour    5 
 
2.11  Under normal circumstances, how often does the price of your firm’s main product change? (Please 
tick only one answer)  2112 
x  more than once a year: 
-  daily    1 
-  weekly    2 
-  monthly    3 
-  quarterly    4 
-  half-yearly    5 
x  once a year    6 
x  every two years    7 
x  less than every two years    8 
x  never    9 
x  there is no specific pattern    10 
 
2.12  Under normal circumstances, are prices changed in any particular month(s)?   
x  no    1  2121 
x  yes, please specifiy which month(s) 
J    F    M    A    M    J    J    A    S    O    N    D   
  01    02    03    04    05    06    07    08    09    10    11    12  2122 
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2.13  To what extent are changes in the price of your main product linked to wage adjustments? 
 (Please tick only one answer)  2131 
x  there is no link    1 
x  there is a link but no particular rule    2 
x  the decisions are taken simultaneously    3 
x  prices are generally changed after wage adjustments    4 
x  wages are generally adjusted after price changes    5  
x  don’t know    6 
 
SECTION 3: INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR FIRM 
 
3.1  How many workers did your firm employ at the end of the reference period? 
Total number of workers  ...............  3101 
permanent full-time workers  ...............  3102 
permanent part-time workers  ...............  3103 
temporary workers (including apprentices and students)  ...............  3104 
other persons working for your firm (agency workers, 
consultants, etc.)  ............... 3105 
 
3.2  During the reference period, what percentage of your firm’s total costs consisted of labour costs 
(including basic remuneration and wages, bonuses, social contributions, training, taxes on labour 
and pension fund contributions)? 
  per cent  3201 
 
3.3  During the reference period, how did your firm’s turnover compare to that for the previous year? 
(Please tick only one answer)  3202 
x  much lower    1   
x  lower    2 
x  approximately the same    3 
x  higher    4 
x  much higher    5 
 
INFORMATION ON THE PERSON COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE: 
  - Name:  ........................................................................................................................... 
  - Job:  ........................................................................................................................... 
  - Telephone:  ........................................................................................................................... 
  - E-mail address (the survey results will be sent to this address):  
    ............................................................................................................................................................. 
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